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Abstract
We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and
intentions based on Shoham’s database perspec-
tive. We separate strong beliefs from weak be-
liefs. Strong beliefs are independent from inten-
tions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding
intentions to strong beliefs and everything that fol-
lows from that. We formalize coherence conditions
on strong beliefs and intentions. We provide AGM-
style postulates for the revision of strong beliefs
and intentions. We show in a representation the-
orem that a revision operator satisfying our postu-
lates can be represented by a pre-order on interpre-
tations of the beliefs, together with a selection func-
tion for the intentions.
1 Introduction
Recently there has been an increase in articles studying the
dynamics of intentions in logic [Ditmarsch et al., 2011;
Icard et al., 2010; Lorini and Herzig, 2008; van der Hoek
et al., 2007; Lorini et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2010]. Most of
those papers take as a starting point the logical frameworks
derived from Cohen and Levesque [1991], which in turn for-
malize Bratman’s [1987] planning theory of intention. In this
paper, we take a different starting point, and study the re-
vision of intentions from a database perspective [Shoham,
2009]. The database perspective consists of a planner, a belief
database and an intention database. Shoham [2016] describes
it as “(...) a generalization of the AGM scheme for belief re-
vision, (...). In the AGM framework, the intelligent database
is responsible for storing the planner’s beliefs and ensuring
their consistency. In the enriched framework, there are two
databases, one for beliefs and one for intentions, which are
responsible for maintaining not only their individual consis-
tency but also their mutual consistency.” (p.48) Shoham fur-
ther developed these ideas with Jacob Banks, one of his PhD
students, and behavioral economist Dan Ariely in the intelli-
gent calendar application Timeful, which attracted over $6.8
million in funding and was acquired by Google in 20151,
who aim to integrate it into their Calendar applications. As
1http://venturebeat.com/2015/05/04/google-acquires-
scheduling-app-timeful-and-plans-to-integrate-it-into-google-apps/
Shoham [2016] says himself: “The point of the story is there
is a direct link between the original journal paper and the ul-
timate success of the company.” (p.47) Thus, it seems clear
that his philosophical proposal has lead to some success on
the practical side. In this paper, we investigate whether his
proposal can lead to interesting theoretical insights as well.
More specifically, the aim of this paper is to develop a suit-
able formal theory for the belief and intention database in
the database perspective, and to study belief and intention
revision for this theory. Following Shoham’s proposal, our
methodology is to generalize AGM revision [Alchourron et
al., 1985] for temporal beliefs and intentions in terms of a
representation theorem.
In the area of intention revision and reconsideration, Grant
et al. [2010] combine intention revision with AGM-like pos-
tulates. There have also been a number of contributions ap-
plying AGM-style revision to action logics [Shapiro et al.,
2011; Jin and Thielscher, 2004; Scherl, 2005; Scherl and
Levesque, 2003; Bonanno, 2007]. However, these proposals
only characterize revision using a set of postulates, without
proving representation theorems. There are also approaches
that focus on the semantical level by postulating revision
on a Kripke model [Baral and Zhang, 2005]. Both Icard et
al. [2010] and van Zee et al. [2015b] develop a logic based
on Shoham’s database perspective and prove representation
theorems, but we will analyze the shortcomings of their pro-
posals in the next section.
The three main technical results of this paper are as
follows: First we review two recent formalisations based
on Shoham’s database perspective, namely the IPS frame-
work [Icard et al., 2010] and the PAL framework [van Zee
et al., 2015a], and we discuss the shortcomings of these log-
ics. Secondly, we extend PAL in order to define a coher-
ence condition on strong beliefs and intentions, and we sep-
arate strong, or intention-independent, beliefs from weak be-
liefs. Lastly, we characterize revision of beliefs and intentions
through AGM-style postulates and we prove a representation
theorem relating the postulates for revision to an ordering
among interpretations and a selection function that accom-
modates new intentions while restoring coherence. The three
next sections of the paper are in line with these three results.
2 Preliminaries: The Database Perspective
We review Shoham’s database perspective, and we discuss
the main limitations of two recent formalizations. For the
first formalization (IPS), the separation between strong and
weak beliefs is problematic, and the representation theorem
only holds for a specific type of beliefs. For the second for-
malization (PAL), intention revision is missing.
2.1 Shoham’s Database Perspective
Shoham’s database perspective contains a planner (e.g., a
STRIPS-like planner) that is itself engaged in some form of
practical reasoning. In the course of planning, it may add ac-
tions to be taken at various times in the future to an intention
database and add observations to a belief database. The inten-
tions are future-directed intentions of the form (a, t), meaning
that action a will be executed at time t.2 The beliefs are also
time-indexed, and are of the form pt , meaning that p is true
at time t. Shoham treats the planner as a “black box”: It pro-
vides the databases with input but its internal workings are
unknown. Shoham proposes informal revision procedures for
beliefs and intentions based on the following coherence con-
ditions:
1. If two intended actions immediately follow one another,
the earlier cannot have postconditions that are inconsis-
tent with the preconditions of the latter.
2. If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its
preconditions do not hold.
3. If you intend to take an action, you believe that its post-
conditions hold.
Note that requirement 2 and 3 describe an asymmetry be-
tween pre-and postconditions: The postconditions are be-
lieved to be true after an intended action, but the precondi-
tions may not. Therefore, we might think of the requirements
as one of “optimistic” beliefs. According to Shoham [2009]:
“It is a good fit with how planners operate. Adopting an op-
timistic stance, they feel free to add intended actions so long
as they are consistent with current beliefs.” (p.7)
2.2 Icard et al. (IPS)
Icard et al. [2010] develop a “formal semantical model to
capture action, belief and intention, based on the ‘database
perspective”’ (p.1). They assume a set of atomic sen-
tences Prop = {p,q,r, . . .} and deterministic primitive actions
Act={a,b,c, . . .}. Entries in the belief database are repre-
sented by a language generated from:
ϕ := pt | pre(a)t | post(a)t | Do(a)t |ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
with p ∈ Prop,a ∈ Act, and t ∈ Z. pt means that p is true at
time t, Do(a)t means that the agent does action a at time t, and
pre(a)t and post(a)t represent respectively the precondition
and postcondition of action a at time t.
Icard et al. use a semantics of appropriate paths. They
define P = P (Prop∪{pre(a), post(a) : a ∈ Act}), and a path
2The notion of intention here is clearly quite restrictive and im-
portant characteristics of intentions are missing. See the conclusion
for a discussion.
pi : Z→ (P×Act) as a mapping from a time point to a set of
proposition-like formulas true at that time (denoted pi(t)1) and
the next action a on the path (denoted pi(t)2). They define
an equivalence relation pi ∼t pi′, which means that pi and pi′
represent the same situation up to t. Using this, they propose
a notion of appropriateness:
Definition 1 (Appropriate Set of Paths). A set of paths Π is
appropriate iff for all pi ∈Π:
• If pi(t)2 = a, then post(a) ∈ pi(t +1)1,
• If pre(a)∈ pi(t)1, then there exists pi′ ∼t pi s.t. pi′(t)2 = a.
The truth definition |=Π is defined relative to an appropriate
set of paths Π, and the modality is defined as follows:
pi, t |=Π ϕ, iff for all pi′ ∈Π, if pi∼t pi′ then pi′, t |= ϕ.
A model for a formula is an appropriate set of paths. They
introduce an intention database I = {(a, t), . . .} as a set of
action-time pairs (a, t) and put the following coherence con-
dition on their logic:
Cohere∗(I) = ♦
∧
(a,t)∈I
pre(a)t .
This captures the intuition that an agent considers it possible
to carry out all intended actions. They state that a set of mod-
els is coherent if and only if there exists a model in which
Cohere∗(I) is true. IPS distinguishes intention-contingent, or
weak, beliefs from non-contingent, or strong, beliefs. Contin-
gent beliefs BI are obtained from a belief-intention database
(B, I) as follows: BI = Cl(B∪ {Do(a)t : (a, t) ∈ I}). In or-
der to switch from belief bases to an appropriate set of paths,
Icard et al. introduce the functions ρ and β: “Given a set of
formulas B, we can consider the set of paths on which all for-
mulas of B hold at time 0, denoted ρ(B). Conversely, given a
set of paths Π, we let β(Π) be defined as the set of formulas
valid at 0 in all paths in Π.” (p.3)
The first issue with IPS is that the definition of non-
contingent beliefs is problematic for coherence. The follow-
ing example shows that non-contingent beliefs that are de-
pendent on the actual path can lead to a coherent agent with
inconsistent weak beliefs.
Example 1. Consider an IPS belief-intention base (B, I) with
the belief base B = {p1,¬♦(do(a)2∧ p1)} and intention base
I = {(a,2)}. While B is consistent with ♦pre(a)2, BI is in-
consistent since ¬♦(do(a)2 ∧ p1)∧ do(a)2 derives ¬p1, but
this is inconsistent with the initial belief p1.
In Section 3 we will define our notion of coherence that
together with a separation between strong and weak beliefs
resolves this problem.
The second issue with IPS is that the definition of ρ is cir-
cular, and as a result it does not seem to be possible for all
formulas of their logic. Consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose B = {p1 ∨¬p1}. The set of paths
ρ(B) contains all paths pi for which pi |= B, i.e. pi |= p1 ∨
¬p1. Take such a path pi arbitrary, so either pi |= p1 or
pi |= ¬p1. Suppose pi |= p1. Then it follows that for all
pi′ ∼t pi we have pi′ |= p1. On the other hand, if pi |= ¬p1,
then it follows that for all pi′ ∼t pi we have pi′ |= ¬p1. So in
both cases we end up with two different sets for ρ(B). In other
words, the set of paths ρ(B) is not defined.
Essentially, according to IPS, ρ(B) = {pi | pi |=Π B}. The
set of appropriate paths for a belief base B is thus constructed
using |=Π. However, |=Π is aleady defined relatively to some
set of paths Π. Therefore, the definition of ρ is circular. It
seems that the ρ function only works for belief bases contain-
ing no modalities (in other words, to construct a single path).
We omit details for space constraints, but the construction of
the canonical model in the proof of their representation the-
orem uses the ρ function to switch from a belief base to a
set of paths (see Proof Sketch in the Appendix of Icard et
al. [2010]). Therefore, the representation theorem does not
hold for all formulas of the logic, since it is not possible to
apply the function ρ to all beliefs.
Summarizing, we recognize two shortcoming of the IPS
framework as a formal basis for the database perspective: The
definition of contingent beliefs is problematic, and the repre-
sentation theorem does not hold for belief bases containing
modalities.
2.3 van Zee et al. (PAL)
van Zee et al. [2015b] develop Parameterized-time Action
Logic (PAL) as an alternative to IPS, claiming that the IPS
framework contains an unsound axiom and that their logic
is noncompact [van Zee et al., 2015a]. They define Act =
{a,b,c, . . .} as a finite set of deterministic primitive actions,
and Prop = {p,q,r, . . .}∪{pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act} as a fi-
nite set of propositions. They denote atomic propositions
with χ. PAL differs syntactically from IPS in that the -
modality is indexed by a time-point. Their language LPAL
is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= χt | do(a)t |tϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
PAL uses a CTL*-like tree semantics consisting of a tree
T = (S,R,v,act) where S is a set of states, R is an accessi-
bility relation that is serial, linearly ordered in the past and
connected, v : S→ 2Prop is a valuation function from states
to sets of propositions, and act : R→ Act is a function from
accessibility relations to actions, such that actions are deter-
ministic, i.e. if act((s,s′)) = act((s,s′′)), then s′ = s′′. Sim-
ilarly to Icard et al., PAL uses an equivalence relation ∼t on
paths. Using this equivalence relations they define a model
as a pair (T,pi) on which the same conditions hold as an IPS
model. PAL formulas are evaluated in a model on a path.
van Zee et al. axiomatize PAL and show that it is sound and
strongly complete, i.e. T ` ϕ iff T |= ϕ. They characterize
AGM belief revision in this logic and restrict time up to some
t. Using these constraints, they are able to represent a belief
set B as a propositional formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ` ϕ}
and they prove the Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) [1991] and
the Darwiche and Pearl (DP) [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] rep-
resentation theorems.
van Zee et al. only consider revision of PAL formulas
and thus do not consider the problem of intention revision,
and therefore also does not distinguish between strong and
weak beliefs. However, PAL uses a standard branching time
(CTL*-like [Reynolds, 2002]) semantics, and it therefore also
does not suffer from the shortcomings that we addressed in
the previous subsection. Therefore, we take PAL as a starting
point and use the remainder of this paper to extend it so that
we can study intention revision.
3 The Belief-Intention Database
We assume an intention database I = {(a, t), . . .} consisting of
time-indexed actions. We next define a coherence condition
on beliefs and intentions in PAL, and we separate strong and
weak beliefs.
3.1 The Coherence Condition
We first demonstrate that Cohere∗(I) of IPS (Section 2.2) is
too permissive because it allows models in which intentions
are not jointly executable.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
s0
{pre(nmr)} s1
{post(nmr)} s2 {post(nop)}
s3
{pre(i jcai),
post(nop)}
s4 {post(i jcai)}
s5 {post(nop)}
nmr
nop
nop
ijcai
nop
Figure 1: Example Model from t = 0 to t = 2.
Example 3 (Running Example). An agent is considering to
attend the NMR workshop at time 0 and the IJCAI conference
at time 1. Although it would like to attend both events, there
is insufficient budget available. Consider a possible partial
semantic model of this situation depicted in Figure 1, where
the thick path represents the actual path. In the actual path,
the agent believes it does nothing at time 0 and attends IJCAI
at time 1. It also considers it possible to attend the NMR
workshop at time 0 and do nothing at time 1 in an alternative
path. However, it does not consider it to be possible to attend
both events.
Suppose the agent of the running example has two inten-
tions: I = {(nmr,0),(i jcai,1)}. Intuitively, the agent’s in-
tentions do not cohere with its beliefs, because it believes it
cannot execute them both due to insufficient budget. How-
ever, according to Cohere∗(I) the agent is coherent because
the preconditions of all intentions hold on some path (namely
the current path). Thus, Cohere∗(I) does not fulfill Shoham’s
coherence condition 1 (Section 2.1). More specifically, the
problem is that it is not possible to define the precondition
of a set of actions in terms of preconditions of individual ac-
tions, because it cannot be ensured that all the intentions are
fulfilled on the same path as well. Therefore, in order to for-
malize a coherence condition in PAL, we extend the language
with preconditions of finite action sequences, which ensures
that after executing the first action, the precondition for the
remaining actions are still true. We modify the language, the
definition of a model, the axiomatization, and we show that
the new axiomatization is sound and strongly complete. We
call the new logic PAL-P (Parameterized-time Action Logic
with extended Preconditions).
Definition 2 (PAL-P Language). The language L is ob-
tained from LPAL by adding {pre(a,b, . . .)t | {a,b, . . .} ⊆
Act, t ∈ N} to the set of propositions. Moreover, Past(t) con-
sists of boolean combinations of pt ′ , pre(a,b, . . .)t ′ ,t ′ϕ and
do(a)t ′−1 where t ′ ≤ t and ϕ is some formula fromL .
We also extend the definition of a model accordingly.
Definition 3 (PAL-P Model). A model is a pair (T,pi) with
T = (S,R,v,act) such that for all pi ∈ T the following holds:
1. If act(pit) = a, then post(a) ∈ v(pit+1),
2. If pre(a) ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with pi∼t pi′
and act(pi′t) = a,
3. If pre(. . . ,a,b)t ∈ v(pit), then pre(. . . ,a)t ∈ v(pit),
4. If pre(a,b, . . .)t ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with
pi∼t pi′, act(pi′t) = a, and pre(b, . . .)t+1 ∈ v(pi′t+1).
We refer to models of PAL-P with m1,m2, . . ., we refer to
sets of models with M1,M2, . . ., and we refer to the set of all
models with M.
Definition 4. The logic PAL-P consists of the all the axiom
schemas and rules of PAL [van Zee et al., 2015b] (Def. 7),
and the following two:
pre(. . . ,a,b)t → pre(. . . ,a)t (A11)
(pre(a,b, . . .)t ∧do(a)t)→ pre(b, . . .)t+1 (A12)
The relation ` is defined in the usual way with the restriction
that necessitation can be applied to theorems only.
Theorem 1 (Completeness Theorem). The logic PAL-P is
sound and strongly complete, i.e. T ` ϕ iff T |= ϕ.3
The proof of the theorem is a direct extension the proof of
van Zee et al. with the new axioms and the new conditions
on a model.
Note that it is not directly possible in PAL-P to express
preconditions for actions that do not occur directly after each
other. In order to do so, we simply make a disjunction over
all possible action combinations in the time points in be-
tween the actions. Thus, if for instance Act = {a,b} and I =
{(a,1),(b,3)}, then Cohere(I) = ♦0∨x∈Act pre(a,x,b)1 =
♦0(pre(a,a,b)1∨ pre(a,b,b)1).4
Definition 5 (Coherence). Given an intention database I =
{(bt1 , t1), . . . ,(btn , tn)} with t1 < .. . < tn, let
Cohere(I) = ♦0
∨
ak∈Act:k 6∈{t1,...,tn}
ak=bk:k∈{t1,...,tn}
pre(at1 ,at1+1, . . . ,atn)t1 .
For a given set of models M, we say that (M, I) is coherent iff
there exists some m ∈M with m |=Cohere(I).
We now show that the new coherence conditions correctly
specifies that the agent of our running example is not coher-
ent.
3We provide the full proofs of all theorems and
propositions in this paper in a separate technical report:
http://www.dropbox.com/s/798g6ki0aqt3gds/ijcai2016proofs.pdf?dl=1
4Our construction of preconditions over action sequences may
lead to a coherence condition involving a big disjunction. This
is a drawback in terms of computational complexity. Alterna-
tively, one may explicitly denote the time of each precondition, e.g.
pre(a,b)(t1,t2). We chose the former since it is conceptually closer
to the original syntax, but the latter can be implemented straightfor-
wardly.
Example 4 (Continued). The models of the agent of our run-
ning example are not coherent with the intention database
I = {(nmr,0),(i jcai,1)}, because the agent does not have the
possibility to jointly execute both intentions (i.e. the precon-
ditions for both actions together is false). Thus, none of the
models satisfy ♦0 pre(nmr, i jcai)0, even though they satisfy
♦0 pre(nmr)0∧♦0 pre(i jcai)1.
3.2 Strong and Weak Beliefs
The idea behind strong beliefs is that they represent the
agent’s ideas about what is inevitable, no matter how it would
act in the world. Weak beliefs, on the other hand, represent
the beliefs of an agent that are the consequence of its planned
actions [Van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003]. Formally, we
define strong beliefs at some time t as formulas that start ei-
ther with ♦t ort . The set of all strong beliefs Bt in time t for
LPAL is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= tψ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ,
where ψ ∈LPAL and t ∈N. A strong belief set in t is Bt ⊆ Bt .
In the remainder of this paper, we assume t = 0 and we simply
write B and B to abbreviate B0 and B0.
The weak beliefs WB(B, I) are obtained from the strong
beliefs by adding beliefs that are contingent on the intentions
of the agent. In other words, the agent weakly believes every-
thing that it strongly believed and moreover that all intentions
will be realised, and everything that follows from this:
WB(B, I) =Cl(B∪{do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I}).
Example 5 (Continued). Some example strong beliefs of
the agent of Figure 1 are ♦0do(nmr)0, ♦0do(i jcai)1, and
0♦1 post(nop)2. If the agent has the intention database
I = {(i jcai,1)}, then post(i jcai)2 is one of its weak beliefs.
4 Belief and Intention Revision
Postulates Following KM, we fix a way of representing a
belief set B consisting of strong beliefs by a propositional for-
mulaψ such that B= {ϕ |ψ`ϕ}. Since intentions and beliefs
that have been added by a planner are naturally bounded up to
some time point t, we define a bounded revision function and
we restrict the syntax and semantics of PAL-P up to a specific
time point. As a consequence, it is then possible to obtain the
single formula ψ for a set of strong beliefs B (Corollary 1).
We first define some notation that we use in the rest of this
paper.
Definition 6. An agent is a pair (ψ, I) consisting of a belief
formula ψ, and an intention base I. A denotes the set of all
agents, B denotes the set of all strong beliefs, I denotes the
set of all intentions, and D denotes the set of all intention
databases. We denote A,B,I, and D bounded up to t with
respectively A|t ,B|t ,I|t , and D|t . However, if the restriction is
clear from context, we may omit the superscript notation.
We now define a bounded revision function ∗t revising an
agent (ψ, I) with a tuple (ϕ, i) consisting of a strong belief
ϕ and an intention i, denoted (ψ, I) ∗t (ϕ, i), where t is the
maximal time point occurring in ψ, I,ϕ, and i.
Definition 7 (Agent Revision Function). An Agent revision
function ∗t : A× (B× I)→ A maps an agent, a strong belief
formula, and an intention— all bounded up to t— to an agent
bounded up to t such that if,
(ψ, I)∗t (ϕ, i) = (ψ′, I′),
(ψ2, I2)∗t (ϕ2, i2) = (ψ′2, I′2),
then following postulates hold:
(P1) ψ′ implies ϕ.
(P2) If ψ∧ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ′ ≡ ψ∧ϕ.
(P3) If ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ′ is also satisfiable.
(P4) If ψ≡ ψ2 and ϕ≡ ϕ2 then ψ′ ≡ ψ′2.
(P5) If ψ≡ ψ2 and ϕ2 ≡ ϕ∧ϕ′ then ψ′∧ϕ′ implies ψ′2.
(P6) If ψ≡ ψ2, ϕ2 ≡ ϕ∧ϕ′, and ψ′∧ϕ′ is satisfiable,
then ψ′2 implies ψ
′∧ϕ′.
(P7) (ψ′, I′) is coherent.
(P8) If (ψ′,{i}) is coherent, then i ∈ I′.
(P9) If (ψ′, I∪{i}) is coherent, then I∪{i} ⊆ I′.
(P10) I′ ⊆ I∪{i}.
(P11) If I = I2, i = i2, and ψ′ ≡ ψ′2, then I′ = I′2.
(P12) For all I′′ with I′ ⊂ I′′ ⊆ I∪{i}:(ψ′, I′′) is not coherent.
Postulates (P1)-(P6) are simply the KM postulates in our
setting, which are equivalent to the AGM postulates [Kat-
suno and Mendelzon, 1991]. They also state that the revision
of strong beliefs does not depend on the intentions. Postu-
lates (P7)-(P10) also appear in IPS. Postulate (P7) states that
the outcome of a revision should be coherent. Postulate (P8)
states that the new intention i take precedence over all other
current intentions; if possible, it should be added, even if all
current intentions have to be discarded. Postulate (P9) and
(P10) together state that if it is possible to simply add the in-
tention, then this is the only change that is made. Postulate
(P11) states that if we revise with the same i but with a differ-
ent belief, and we end up with the same belief in both cases,
then we also end up with the same intentions. Finally, (P12)
states that we do not discard intentions unnecessarily. This
last postulate is comparable to the parsimony requirement in-
troduced by Grant et al. [2010].
Representation Theorem We next characterize all revision
schemes satisfying (P1)-(P12) in terms of minimal change
with respect to an ordering among interpretations and a selec-
tion function accommodating new intentions while restoring
coherence. We bound models of strong beliefs up to t, which
means that all the paths in the model are “cut off” at t. This
ensures finitely many non-equivalent formulas for some be-
lief set B. A t-bounded model m|t = (T |t ,pi|t) is a model con-
taining a tree T in which all paths, including pi, have length
t. Strong beliefs are about possibility and necessity, and they
are independent of a specific path. Therefore, if a single path
in a tree is a model of a strong belief, then all paths in this tree
are models of this strong belief. Formally, a set of models of
a strong belief MSB satisfies the following condition:
If (T,pi) ∈MSB, then (T,pi′) ∈MSB for all pi′ ∈ T.
A set of t-bounded models of a strong belief M|tSB contains
only t restricted models of a strong belief. We write M|tSB
to denote the set of all sets of t-bounded models of strong
beliefs. We now show that we can represent a set of models
of strong beliefs by a single formula.
Lemma 1. Let Ext(M|tSB) be the set of all possible extensions
of a set of bounded model of strong beliefs M|tSB to models, i.e.
Ext(M|tSB) = {m ∈M | m|t ∈M|tSB}. Given a set of t-bounded
models of strong beliefs M|tSB, there exists a strong belief for-
mula f orm(M|tSB) such that Mod( f orm(M
|t
SB)) = Ext(M
|t
SB).
Corollary 1. Given a t-bounded strong belief set B, there
exists a formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ` ϕ}.
Proof Sketch. For a given belief set B, we can show that there
exists a set of t-bounded models of a strong belief M|tSB s.t.
Ext(M|tSB) = Mod(B). If ψ = f orm(M
|t
SB), then Mod(ψ) =
Mod(B), and by the completeness theorem, B =Cl(ψ).
Given an intention database I, we define a selection func-
tion γtI that tries to accommodate a new intention based on
strong beliefs. The selection function specifies preferences
on which intention an agent would like to keep in the pres-
ence of the new beliefs.
Definition 8 (Selection Function). Given an intention
database I, a selection function γtI : MSB × I → D maps a
set of models of a strong belief and an intention to an up-
dated intention database—all bounded up to t— such that if
γtI(M|t ,{i}) = I′, then:
1. (M|t , I′) is coherent.
2. If (M|t ,{i}) is coherent, then i ∈ I′.
3. If (M|t , I∪{i}) is coherent, then I∪{i} ⊆ I′.
4. I′ ⊆ I∪{i}.
5. For all I′′ with I′ ⊂ I′′ ⊆ I∪{i}:(M|t , I′′) is not coherent.
The five conditions on the selection function are in direct
correspondence with postulates (P7)-(P10), (P12) of the agent
revision function ∗t . Note that postulate (P11) doesn’t have a
corresponding condition in the definition above but is repre-
sented by the fact that the selection function takes the revised
beliefs as input. That is, intention revision occurs after belief
revision.
KM define a faithful assignment from a belief formula to a
pre-order over models. Since we are also considering inten-
tions, we extend this definition such that it also maps inten-
tions databases to selection functions.
Definition 9 (Faithful assignment). A faithful assignment is
a function that assigns to each strong belief formula ψ ∈ B|t
a total pre-order ≤tψ over M and to each intention database
I ∈D|t a selection function γtI and satisfies the following con-
ditions:
1. If m1,m2 ∈Mod(ψ), then m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1.
2. If m1 ∈Mod(ψ) and m2 6∈Mod(ψ), then m1 < m2.
3. If ψ≡ φ, then ≤tψ=≤tφ.
4. If T |t = T |t2 , then (T,pi) ≤tψ (T2,pi2) and (T2,pi2) ≤tψ
(T,pi).
Conditions 1 to 3 on the faithful assignment are the same
as those of KM. Condition 4 ensures that we do not distin-
guish between models in the total pre-order ≤tψ whose trees
are the same up to time t. This is essentially what is repre-
sented in the revision function by bounding the all input of
the revision function ∗t up to t. Moreover, ≤tψ does not dis-
tinguish between models obtained by selecting two different
paths from the same tree. This corresponds to the fact that we
are using strong belief formulas in the revision, which do not
distinguish between different paths in the same tree as well.
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem). An agent revision op-
erator ∗t satisfies postulates (P1)-(P12) iff there exists a faith-
ful assignment that maps each ψ to a total pre-order ≤tψ and
each I to a selection function γtI such that if (ψ, I) ∗t (ϕ, i) =
(ψ′, I′), then:
1. Mod(ψ′) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ)
2. I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i)
Proof Sketch. We only sketch the proof of “ ⇒′′: Suppose
that some agent revision operator ∗t satisfies postulates (P1)-
(P12). Given models m1 and m2, let (ψ, /0) ∗t ( f orm(m|t1 )∨
f orm(m|t2 ),ε) = (ψ
′, /0). We define ≤tψ by m1 ≤tψ m2 iff
m1 |= ψ or m1 |= ψ′. We also define γtI by γtI(M|t SB, i) = I′,
where ( f orm(M|t SB), I) ∗t (>, i) = (ψ2, I′) (note that ψ2 ≡
f orm(M|t SB)).
Let us prove condition 4 of Definition 9. For m1 = (T,pi)
and m2 = (T2,pi2), let ψ′ be as above. Since ψ,ψ′ ∈ B|t and
T |t = T |t2 , we have m1 |= ψ iff m2 |= ψ and m1 |= ψ′ iff m2 |=
ψ′, so m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1.
Following KM, one can show that conditions 1 to 3
from Definition 9 hold, and furthermore that Mod(ψ′) =
min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ). We now prove I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i).
By our definition of γtI we have that (ψ′, I) ∗t (>, i) =
(ψ2,γtI(Mod(ψ′), i)) (recall that ψ′ ≡ ψ2). Since (ψ, I) ∗t
(ϕ, i) = (ψ′, I′), by (P11) we obtain that I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i).
Using postulate (P7)-(P10) and (P12) we can prove that γtI is
a selection function.
Finally, it turns out to be straightforward to formulate the
DP postulates for iterated revision in our framework for the
strong beliefs and to prove their representation theorem. Due
to space constraints we have omitted the results, but they can
be found in a separate technical report.5
5 Related Work
Grant et al. [2010] develop AGM-style postulates for belief,
intention, and goal revision. They provide a detailed analysis
and propose different reconsideration strategies, but restrict
themselves to a syntactic analysis. Much effort in combin-
ing AGM revision with action logics (e.g., the Event Calcu-
lus [Mueller, 2010], Temporal Action Logics [Kvarnstro¨m,
2005], extensions to the Fluent Calculus [Thielscher, 2001],
and extensions to the Situation Calculus (see [Patkos, 2010,
5
http://www.dropbox.com/s/798g6ki0aqt3gds/ijcai2016proofs.pdf?dl=1
Ch.2] for an overview)) concentrates on extending these ac-
tion theories to incorporate sensing or knowledge-producing
actions. Shapiro et al. [2011] extend the Situation Calculus
to reason about beliefs rather than knowledge by introducing
a modality B and shows that both the AGM postulates and
the DP postulates are satisfied in this framework. A similar
approach concerning the Fluent Calculus has been formal-
ized by Jin and Thielscher [2004], and is further developed
by Scherl [2005] and Scherl and Levesque [2003] by taking
into account the frame problem as well. However, none of
these approaches prove representations theorems linking re-
vision to a total pre-order on models. Baral and Zhang [2005]
model belief updates on the basis of semantics of modal logic
S5 and show that their knowledge update operator satisfies all
the KM postulates. Bonanno [2007] combines temporal logic
with AGM belief revision by extending a temporal logic with
a belief operator and an information operator. Both these ap-
proaches do not take action or time into account and do not
prove representation theorems. The concept of strong beliefs
has been discussed extensively in the literature, for instance
in the story of Little Nell [McDermott, 1982] or a paradox
found in knowledge-based programs [Fagin et al., 1995] (see
van der Hoek et al. [2003] for a detailed discussion).
6 Conclusion
We develop a logical theory for reasoning about temporal be-
liefs and intentions based on Shoham’s database perspective.
We propose postulates for revision of strong beliefs and in-
tentions, and prove a representation theorem relating the pos-
tulates to our formal model. Icard et al. prove a comparable
representation theorem, but we show in this paper that it does
not hold in general. In their proof, they use a canonical model
construction, while we proof our representation theorem us-
ing standard techniques from belief revision. It remains an
open problem whether a canonical model construction is pos-
sible when proving the representation theorem of Icard et al.
For future work, we aim to extend our formalism with
goals, which seems a natural extension in order to allow the
agent to, for instance, replace intentions instead of merely
discarding them. This paves the road to develop a richer
notion of intentions, such as that “intentions normally pose
problems for the agents; the agent needs to determine a way
of achieving them” [Cohen and Levesque, 1990]. Interest-
ingly, adding goals to the formalism blurs the distinction be-
tween planner and databases. If the databases take over part
of the planning, then well-known problems such as the frame
problem become more stringent.
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